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1. Introduction 
 
If we focus on constitutional law, the macro-conceptualisations of 
mainstream comparative law have very little to say. In other words, the 
general characterisations of comparative law are virtually useless in terms of 
constitutional law. If and when Nordic systems are viewed from a 
comparative constitutional perspective, however, certain commonalities are 
discernible. But there are also differences. The following analysis in this 
chapter is not doctrinal but, rather, reflects legal-cultural and historical 
dimensions of living Nordic constitutions.1 
 
The underlying idea of this chapter is to offer a thematic overview of the 
Nordic constitutions for a non-Nordic reader. Because of limited space there 
is no point in trying to describe constitutions descriptively in such a manner 
that would be easy to replace by internet searches or reading English 
translations of constitutional documents. Instead, this chapter briefly explains 
the context and generalities of four Nordic constitutions comparatively and 
then quickly moves to thematically highlight and characterise chosen key 
features of each constitution. Crucially, the stress in this paper is placed on 
distinctive features; the observations are general and should thus be treated 
with some caution. In the case of Finland the focus is on the role of the 
parliament’s Constitutional Committee as the guardian of constitutionality. 
As for Sweden, the focus is on the exceptionally central position of its 
parliament. As for Norway, this paper discusses the central role of the 
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1 This is a rational choice in the comparative constitutional approach because written 
constitutional documents are not really power maps. Instead, they may be inaccurate or, as 
Mark Tushnet puts it, “The realities of power may not be fully reflected in a constitution”, 
Tushnet (2015), p. 11. 
Supreme Court. In the case of Denmark, discussion centres on national 
sovereignty. When it comes to Iceland, the new creative manner of reforming 
constitution is highlighted. Moreover, this chapter shortly addresses the 
protection of human rights in the Nordic systems, especially in relation to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, before 
individual country discussions, the following section offers a general 
comparative overview of the Nordic constitutional landscape. 
 
 
2. The Nordic Constitutional Landscape  
 
2.1 Constitutional Mentality 
Even while the abovementioned classifications offered by comparative 
lawyers are not especially fruitful in the case of Nordic constitutional law, 
certain useful comparative notions may be utilised in this context. To begin 
with, Nordic legal systems clearly possess some features of the continental 
legal tradition.2 These features are, however, not completely identical: legal 
systematics is – basically – continental in upholding the division between 
private and public law. Key constitutional documents (constitutional or 
equivalent acts) in the Nordic countries are written or codified even though 
they are supplemented in various ways by other formal acts, amendments, 
constitutional conventions or customary constitutional rules and praxis. 
Crucially, Nordic systems favour a specific idea of the constitutional act with 
lex superior status, where constitutional acts are located at the peak of the 
national hierarchy of legal norms. This feature separates Nordic constitutions 
from such common law constitutional systems as the UK and New Zealand. 
 
In comparative overview, the question of safeguarding constitutionality holds 
an important position. Nordic systems employ some kind of mechanisms for 
reviewing the constitutionality of legislation.3 Accordingly, these systems 
presuppose some form of separation of powers. Nevertheless, there are 
different constitutional arrangements as to how judicial review is organised. 
Denmark does not have an explicit constitutional provision concerning 
judicial review. However, it hesitantly recognises judicial review as part of 
its systems. Finland and Sweden have explicit written constitutional 
provisions concerning judicial review, although in practice judicial review is 
resorted to cautiously. Norway added judicial review by an amendment to its 
 
2 This part of the article draws on the author’s book Nordic Reflections on Constitutional 
Law: a Comparative Nordic Perspective, see especially Chapter 6.  
3 See also Hautamäki (2007). 
Constitution Act in 2014. A significant general difference nevertheless exists 
between levels of judicial activism. Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Iceland 
all accommodate de facto judicial self-restraint, whereas Norway’s judicial 
self-restraint is clearly less cautious. Differences in judicial review are also 
reflected elsewhere: Sweden and Finland do not strictly follow the principle 
of separation of powers, whereas Norway and Denmark are perhaps inclined 
more towards separation of powers, although in a parliamentary form. 
 
Given these points, we may speak of a Nordic constitutional mentality which 
is visible, among other things, in the ways that supreme courts take into 
account the will of the legislator. The Nordic conception of democracy is of 
utmost importance in this context. In effect, Nordic judicial systems hold 
great respect for their national parliaments as democratically chosen 
legislators. This is reflected in the use of preparatory legislative works as a 
recognised source of law. Even though the Norwegian Supreme Court has 
been the most active, it prefers to seek to avoid open power conflicts with the 
Norwegian parliament.  
 
Some common law-type features can also be found in the Nordic systems. 
For instance, all Nordic systems have room for norms or doctrines that are 
unwritten but still hold a notable constitutional position. To illustrate, in 
Norway the case law of its Supreme Court occupies a focal position4. 
Additionally, certain parts of the constitutional act that deal with the monarch 
are de facto in a state of desuetudo, especially in Norway. Likewise, the 
Finnish system contains some customary elements such as the de facto 
binding force of opinions of the Constitutional Committee of Parliament and 
the position that (external academic) constitutional specialists enjoy in the a 
priori form of control.  
 
Consequently, all this provides a view to a legal thinking that is more 
pragmatic (lacking formalism, and with the deductive and scholarly nature of 
German-style Juristenrecht) than in the civil law legal family. However, the 
distinction between public and private law stemming from Roman law is 
clearly a common feature with civil law, although the distinction is not sharp 
in the Nordic systems as, for example, may be seen by the fact that Denmark, 
Norway and Iceland have no separate administrative courts, which is 
regarded as one of the hallmarks of the continental notion of law. Besides, all 
 
4 According to Svein Eng, the Norwegian Supreme Court may become closer to the 
“discursive English style” in the future, Eng (1997), p. 214. 
the Nordic systems are parliamentary. Denmark, Norway, Iceland and 
Sweden are plainly parliamentary systems, as indeed is Finland, especially 
after the total reform of its Constitution in 2000. Notably, in Finland the 
president’s role was diminished when the position of the parliament and the 
cabinet was strengthened, so that Finland moved closer to other Nordic 
systems in this respect. Correspondingly, the fact that the Nordic parliaments 
play such a crucial role is one of the reasons for the cautiousness of Nordic 
forms of judicial review (with the possible exception of Norway): not much 
room is available for courts to quarrel with a highly legitimate national 
parliament. Moreover, the contextual constitutional landscapes are generally 
quite close to each other: relatively small Evangelical-Lutheran populations, 
multiparty systems, a high standard of living, an ideology of gender equality, 
a high level of development, and generally shared ideas about the modern 
welfare state.5 
 
2.2 The Key Position of the Parliament  
As already noted above, the parliament holds a central position in the Nordic 
systems as the legislative organ representing the people. However, respect for 
the will of the legislator does not take the same form as, for example, in 
France, where the judicial style of the courts is less argumentative than in the 
Nordic systems; Nordic forms of judicial decision-making do not stick so 
closely to the written statutory text but seek a rather more general 
argumentative base for justificatory purposes. Similarly, a certain general 
Nordic doctrinal openness of argumentation is discernible; in this way it 
differs from sparse French and German lengthy pedantic style. Furthermore, 
none of the Nordic supreme courts plays such a clearly political role as do 
continental constitutional courts. With this in mind, the implicit doctrine of 
the ‘political question’ is to be found in all Nordic systems; the politicisation 
of courts is not applauded in the Nordic systems since it is the national 
parliaments that perform the role of legislator. Accordingly, none of the 
supreme courts or other controlling organs possesses the competence to 
formally nullify parliamentary acts.  
 
Under these circumstances, Nordic supreme courts and other constitutional 
control organs have traditionally played a stabilising and mediating role 
between various branches of state public power. In short, “[i]n Nordic 
countries, it is universally accepted that it is elected politicians who should 
 
5 For more detailed, though slightly outdated, analysis of Nordic constitutionalism see 
Scheinin (2001). 
take the most important decisions in the public sphere”.6 For these reasons, 
courts generally speaking fulfil only a minor role as constitutional players; 
courts perform their judicial functions but that is mostly all that there is to it. 
 
On the whole, constitutional law in the Nordic sphere is not all about codified 
or written rules. For instance, in Norway and Denmark, constitutional acts are 
held as important national symbols, not merely a collection of written rules. 
However, in Finland, Sweden and Iceland, constitutional acts do not perform 
equally strong symbolic functions, so that interpretation of the constitution is 
slightly more pragmatic. All in all, the Nordic version of constitutionalism 
contains a few common macro-elements, including legal, cultural and 
political elements. These can be listed as follows: a parliamentary system 
with a mixture of separation of powers as political meta-ideology; consensual 
democracy (avoidance of open conflict, multi-party system); cautious 
systems of judicial review (judicial self-restraint, no strong culture of rights); 
respect for the will of the legislator (avoidance of conflict between the 
parliament and supreme courts; significance of preparatory works as a source 
of law); the political question doctrine in use by the courts7; no separate 
constitutional courts; a combination of written and unwritten rules and 
principles (constitutions also contain customary material); a spirit of 
constitutionalism and rule of law (general respect for the rules of the 
constitution within parliamentary frames; effective hierarchy of rules, i.e. 
constitutional acts are not political manifestos; doctrine of separation of 
powers); and a pragmatic and practical legal style. Finally, we may also note 
that Nordic constitutions seem to maintain a certain degree of flexibility: 
although constitutional acts are written, alteration takes place in various 
forms, i.e. by formal amendment, custom, convention, and case law.8 
 
The greatest differences appear between the eastern and western members of 
Nordic law; by extending the family metaphor one might say that Sweden 
and Finland are the eastern brothers of Denmark, Norway and Iceland in the 
west. Sweden and Finland are (or at least have been) closer to each other than 
the country-pair of Denmark and Norway. Denmark, Norway and Iceland are 
NATO members whereas Finland and Sweden are militarily neutral 
countries, although this neutrality should be seen in a different light than 
before due to membership of the EU and more recently a loose partnership 
 
6 Cameron (2009), p. 72.  
7 Cf. Elo Rytter (2000), 46-47. 
8 See also the conclusions drawn by Italian constitutional comparatist Duranti (2009), 243-
245. 
with NATO. Furthermore, the level of political isolationism varies from 
Norway’s relatively high level of isolationism to (present-day) Finland’s 
relatively high level of internationalism. 
 
What is more, parliamentarism is reflected on the protection of fundamental 
rights. Essentially, the Nordic countries have three dimensions in their 
systems: domestic constitutions, European conventions, and global 
conventions. Constitutional protection varies from country to country, but a 
common feature is that the ECHR is the most important human rights 
instrument. All the Nordic countries have incorporated the ECHR into their 
domestic legal systems. The brief analyses in this chapter focuses in particular 
on the dialogue between the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and 
national courts because this sheds light on the special quality of each Nordic 
constitution.9 
  
Altogether, it seems that significant doctrinal, functional, political, cultural 
and historical similarities can be pointed out even though there are 
institutional differences. Moreover, Nordic constitutions may be 
characterised as socially and politically successful constitutions because they 
have provided a stable framework for democratic governance. In summary, 
Nordic constitutions appear to be systems operating with similar foundational 
values, although differences exist in constitutional rules, institutions, and 
cultures.10 As a result, we may speak of “Nordicness” in terms of 
constitutional law. In the following sections we will highlight and discuss the 
distinctive constitutional-cultural dimensions of the Nordic constitutions 
which are not similar. 
 
 
3. Constitutional Variations on a Nordic Theme  
 
3.1 Finland’s Constitution  
The Finnish Constitution is technically enshrined in a single act, i.e. the 
Finnish Constitution, which entered into force in 2000.11 Before the present 
Constitution Act there were four separate constitutional acts – following the 
 
9 The discussion on fundamental rights in this chapter benefited from the paper provided 
by Jonas Christoffersen, Director, The Danish Institute for Human Rights – Denmark’s Na-
tional Human Rights Institution. 
10 And yet we may see that Norway and Denmark (west-Nordic) are closer to each other 
than Sweden and Finland (east-Nordic). 
11 This section is based on Husa (2011). 
Swedish tradition – which were: the Form of Government Act (1919), the 
Procedure of Parliament Act (1922), the Ministerial Responsibility Act 
(1922), and the Act on the High Court of Impeachment (1922). In essence, 
the Constitution Act provides a catalogue of constitutional rights and 
provisions about the principles for the exercise of public power by 
government, the organisation of the government and the relationships 
between the highest organs of the state. In 2012 the Constitution Act was 
amended. These amendments clarified the division of powers between the 
President of the Republic and the government. Moreover, provisions were 
added on membership in the EU – Finland has been a member of the EU since 
1995 – and on the citizens' initiative. 
 
Generally speaking, Finland is a parliamentary democracy with certain semi-
presidential elements i.e. it has a president as the head of state and with certain 
competences which are listed in the Constitution Act. On a day-to-day basis 
the Finnish system functions as a parliamentary system and the president 
stays in the background. As a general remark we can say that Finnish 
governance normally works so that it seeks consensus rather than partisan 
solutions backed by a temporary majority, i.e. the constitutional culture 
strives towards consensus. This produces a certain rigidity, i.e. the 
Constitution changes relatively slowly, both in a legal and in a political sense. 
 
The Finnish system is based on core principles according to which power is 
vested in the people, who are represented by deputies assembled in the 
parliament. Crucially, legislative power is exercised by the parliament 
whereas the President of the Republic plays a minor role. According to the 
Constitution Act, the top level of governance is the Council of State (i.e. the 
government) which is headed by a prime minister and a requisite number of 
other ministers. Following the principle of parliamentary systems, the 
government and its individual members must enjoy the confidence of the 
parliamentary majority. Another key point is that judicial power is vested in 
independent courts of law, at the highest level in the Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Administrative Court. 
 
In comparative constitutional analysis the most distinctive feature of the 
Finnish system is the manner in which it guards the constitutionality of 
statutory laws. Even in a global comparison this feature stands out as a unique 
quasi-judicial arrangement. 
 
As already mentioned above, Finland has no constitutional court but courts 
are allowed to perform judicial review of legislation to a certain limited 
extent. After the total reform of the Constitution Act in 2000, it became 
possible for courts to perform judicial review of legislation. The idea of 
constitutionality, however, is not limited to judicial review only because, in 
addition to the courts, other public authorities are also obliged to interpret 
legislation in such a manner that adheres to the Constitution and to respect 
constitutional and human rights. According to the Constitution Act (Article 
106), the courts must give preference to the Constitution when they decide a 
case if the application of a parliamentary act would be in manifest conflict (in 
Finnish “ilmeinen ristiriita”) with the Constitution Act.12 In a handful of 
cases, starting from 2004, the courts have applied Article 106 but in the 
overall picture judicial review by the courts plays a minor role in terms of 
guarding the constitutionality of parliamentary acts.13 However, certain signs 
are discernible of the gradually growing constitutional role of the judiciary.14 
 
In practice, the constitutionality of laws is examined in advance i.e. before an 
act enters into force. Review mainly takes place in the parliament’s influential 
Constitutional Law Committee (Perustuslakivaliokunta). The function of this 
parliamentary-bound control is advance prevention of laws conflicting with 
the Constitution being enacted in the ordinary legislative procedure. From the 
constitutional point of view, the Committee’s key function is to issue 
statements on bills sent to it for consideration and on the constitutionality of 
other legislative matters and their bearing on international human rights. Even 
while the Committee’s members are ordinary members of the parliament, the 
Committee calls experts (on the basis of constitutional convention) to give 
evidence, and the Committee itself operates in a non-party-political manner 
in reporting to the parliament. These reports are official statements and are 
respected by the government, which seeks to amend the provisions of a bill 
that the Committee has found to be unconstitutional before the bill is passed. 
If the unconstitutionality is significant it means, in practice, that the bill is 
withdrawn and the government has to think of another way to proceed 
because in a multiparty-system governments do not have the required 
qualified majority to change the Constitution Act.  
 
 
12 This Article was adopted as an alternative to establishing a Constitutional Court, 
Government Proposal (Hallituksen esitys 1/1998) 53-54. 
13 See Husa (2011), 186-187. 
14 See Ojanen (2009). 
From a comparative point of view the fact that the Constitutional Committee 
functions in a non-political quasi-judicial manner (e.g. statements are based 
on the evidence given by constitutional experts, the Committee follows its 
own “precedents”, there is no party-political discipline) is particularly 
significant. All this results in a unique system of controlling the 
constitutionality of legislation in which an abstract ex ante and concrete case-
bound review mechanism are combined. Importantly, the significance of the 
Perustuslakivaliokunta is reflected in the whole legal system and its 
statements hold a special status as a source of law as de facto precedents.15 
Only with slight exaggeration one may characterise the weight of these 
statements as de facto “constitutional precedents”. 
 
During the last five years, Finland has been found by the ECtHR to have 
violated the ECHR in fourteen instances. The main issue in Finland, based on 
the findings from the last five years, is observance of the principle of ne bis 
in idem. In five cases the Finnish courts have been found by the ECtHR to 
have convicted the applicants of the same matter in two different sets of 
proceedings: Finland had thereby violated Article 4 of Protocol no. 7.16 
Another main challenge appears to be striking a balance between freedom of 
expression and protection of other interests. Thus in four cases the ECtHR 
found that Finland had violated Article 10.17  
 
In three cases, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 concerning private 
and family life.18 Two of these cases concerned the application of transitional 
provisions implementing the Finnish Paternity Act of 1976.19 In the third case, 
which is much more rare case type for Finland, the Court additionally found 
a violation of Article 5 concerning freedom of liberty in a case regarding 
enforced confinement in a mental institution and forced administration of 
drugs, as safeguards against arbitrariness had been inadequate.20  
 
 
15 See Husa (2011), 78-88. 
16 Nykänen v Finland, no. 11828/11, ECHR 2014; Glantz v Finland, no. 37394/11, ECHR 
2014; Kiiveri v. Finland, no. 53753/12, ECHR 2015; Rinas v. Finland, no. 17039/13; 
Österlund v. Finland, no. 53179/13, ECHR 2015.  
17 Lahtonen v. Finland, no. 29576/09, ECHR 2012; Ristamäki and Korvola v. Finland, no 
66456/09, ECHR 2013; Niskasaari and Otavamedia Oy v. Finland, no. 32297/10, ECHR 
2015; M.P. v. Finland, no. 36487/12, ECHR 2016.  
18 X v. Finland, no. 34806/04, ECHR 2012; Laakso v. Finland, no. 7361/05, ECHR 2013; 
Röman v. Finland, no. 13072/05, ECHR 2013.  
19 Laakso, 2013; Röman, 2013.  
20 X, 2012.  
 3.2 Sweden’s Constitution 
Sweden has five key constitutional documents. These are the Instrument of 
Government (1974), the Act of Succession (1810), the Freedom of the Press 
Act (1949), the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression (1991), and the 
Riksdag (i.e. Swedish parliament) Act (1974). Alongside these constitutional 
documents, EU laws hold significant constitutional weight in the Swedish 
system, as in Finland and Denmark. In constitutional essence, Sweden is a 
constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. Like Finland, Sweden 
has been an EU member since 1995.21 And, again like Finland, Swedish 
constitutional practice tends strongly to strive towards consensus, which 
produces significant constitutional stability.22 
 
The Instrument of Government contains the written basic principles of the 
form of government, dealing with such issues as how the government 
functions, fundamental freedoms and rights, and how elections to the Riksdag 
are to be implemented. When the Instrument of Government came into force 
it reduced the powers of the monarch. For this reason, the monarch remains 
as the head of state but with stripped political powers. The Act of Succession 
stipulates who is to inherit the throne. Until 1979 the succession was through 
the male bloodline but two years after the birth of Princess Victoria the 
Riksdag decided that a female could also inherit the throne. The Freedom of 
the Press Act was adopted in 1949, although the freedom of the press was 
already established by law in 1766. This act provides the right to disseminate 
information in printed form but it also concerns the principle of public access 
to official documents. The Law on Freedom of Expression contains 
provisions on free dissemination of information and prohibits censorship. 
These abovementioned acts are constitutional acts, which means they are 
more difficult to amend or repeal than other acts. Similarly, according to the 
hierarchy of norms, no other acts or ordinances may – in principle – conflict 
with these constitutional laws. 
 
Alongside the abovementioned documents, also of constitutional importance 
is the Riksdag Act, which contains detailed provisions on the parliament and 
its workings. This act enjoys a curious status between a constitutional act and 
an ordinary act. To amend this act requires only one Riksdag decision but it 
must be adopted by a qualified majority of at least three-quarters of votes and 
 
21 For a general informative overview see Nergelius (2011). 
22 Cf. Bull (2014), p. 12. 
the support of more than half the members. Now, in comparative 
constitutional analysis one of the most striking general features of the 
Swedish system is the central position of the Riksdag.23 Notwithstanding, this 
is not to suggest that parliaments in other Nordic countries would not be in a 
central position. However, centrality seems to be legally-culturally 
emblematic in terms of the Swedish Constitution. 
 
So, we must be cautious when underlining the role of the Riksdag because all 
Nordic constitutions rely on the foundational idea and doctrine of 
parliamentary democracy and a representative form of government. Be that 
as it may, the Swedish system in particular seems to grant de facto a distinctly 
focal constitutional weight to its parliament. To be sure, the Instrument of 
Government provides (Article 4.1) that “the Riksdag is the foremost 
representative of the people”. However, as a written constitutional provision 
this article is in line with the rest of the Nordic constitutions. From a 
comparative point of view, the actual highlighted constitutional position of 
the Riksdag can be seen in the doctrine of sources of law. In practice, Swedish 
lawyers routinely use travaux préparatoires when they try to obtain more 
information about a law i.e. they seldom use the text of the law alone. This is 
not only a Swedish legal cultural feature but applies to all Nordic systems, 
although there are clear national variations. Basically, the underlying idea of 
this kind of source-of-law doctrine is to be found from the constitution in the 
broad sense of the word i.e. not only does the text of the constitutional 
document play a significant role but also constitutional practices and 
conventions have a strong foothold in moulding the legal mentality of 
Swedish lawyers.  
 
Notably, the final justification for giving so much weight to travaux is the 
understanding of constitutional democracy itself; as Peczenik and Bergholz 
say “travaux préparatoires should be taken into account because they form a 
part of a democratic and rationally justifiable legislative procedure.”24 At the 
same time, one might perhaps sometimes claim that the heightened role of 
the Riksdag shadows the legal function of the constitution. One telling 
indication of the role of the Riksdag is the cautious tradition of judicial 
review, which is the constitutional flipside of the coin; the great respect for 
 
23 As Ola Zetterquist says “The traditional position in Swedish constitutional law is that 
courts are not to exercise any political power of significance since such a position is 
atypical of the Swedish constitution where political power should rest with the Riksdag”, 
Zetterquist (2008), p. 98. See also Bull (2014), p. 16, holding basically a similar view. 
24 Peczenik and Bergholz (1991), p. 328. 
the parliament – as in Finland – seems to hinder the courts from taking a more 
active role in controlling the constitutionality of parliamentary acts. 
 
In any case, in 1979 the Instrument of Government was reformed and a 
cautious form of judicial review was taken as a part of the written 
Constitution. The provision on judicial review (in Swedish 
“lagprövningsrätt”) stated that a court could declare a parliamentary act to be 
in violation of the Constitution or a government decree and, thus, inapplicable 
but only if the error was of manifest/evident nature. This provision – which 
was worded similarly to the Finnish model – has had very little practical effect 
on the behaviour of the courts. Since 2011 provisions no longer need to be in 
evident conflict with a constitutional rule in order to be set aside by a court 
or other public body. However, this reform did not mean a startling break 
from the centrality of the Riksdag because the provision in question also 
contains a second part which states that: “In the case of review of an act of 
law under paragraph one, particular attention must be paid to the fact that the 
Parliament is the foremost representative of the people and that fundamental 
law takes precedence over other law.” In other words, even while giving in to 
pressure for stronger judicial review, the Swedish system in fact sought to 
fuse together the old Riksdag-centred thinking and more recent separation of 
powers with a stronger judicial review doctrine.25 As shown above, the strong 
position of the Riksdag is still a fundamental key feature of the Swedish 
Constitution, especially if placed in a comparative analytical framework. 
 
Sweden has been found by the ECtHR to have committed violations of the 
ECHR in fourteen cases during the latest five-year period. Five of these cases 
concerned violations of Article 3 in relation to expulsion of asylum-seekers.26 
Four cases concerned Article 627 and three cases Article 8 of the convention.28 
 
25 In Government’s proposal (Regeringens proposition 2009/10:80, 145-147) it is 
explained that reform strengthens the constitutional control after the legislative phase and 
this, in turn, actually secures the key position of the Riksdag. The risk that this would 
politicize the courts is expressly deemed as ungrounded.  
26 F.N. and others v. Sweden, no. 28774/09, ECHR 2012; S.F. and others v. Sweden, no. 
52077/10, ECHR 2012; I v. Sweden, no. 61204/09, ECHR 2013; J.K. and others v. Sweden, 
no. 59166/12, ECHR 2016; F.G. v. Sweden, no. 43611/11, ECHR 2016.  
27 Olsby v. Sweden, no. 36124/06, ECHR 2012; Karin Andersson and others v. Sweden, no. 
29878/09, ECHR 2014; Naku v. Lithuania and Sweden, no. 26126/07, ECHR 02016; 
Arlewin v. Sweden, no. 22302/10, ECHR 2016.  
28 Strömblad v. Sweden, no. 3684/07, ECHR 2012; Rousk v. Sweden, no. 27183/04, ECHR 
2013; Söderman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786/08, ECHR 2013.  
The last three cases dealt with violations of Article 4 of Protocol no. 7,29 
Article 1 of Protocol no. 1,30 and the right to an effective remedy under Article 
13.31  
 
 
3.3 Norway’s Constitution  
The Norwegian Constitution Act was adopted in 1814. This means that it is 
the second oldest written constitutional document in the world still in force. 
Although technically it is like any constitution act, its characteristic 
significance seems to be more central than in other Nordic countries because 
for Norwegians it symbolizes freedom, independence and democracy. In 
addition, because of the considerable age of the constitutional document the 
role of customary constitutional law is greater than in the other Nordic 
systems.32 The constitutional system of Norway is, like Sweden and 
Denmark, a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary democratic system 
of governance. According to the constitutional provision, the king is the 
country’s head of state and can select his council. But, according to 
constitutional practice the government may govern only with the confidence 
of the Storting (i.e. the parliament). In fact, the king has very little actual 
political power. However, the king still seems to hold a crucial symbolic 
function as the head of state and official representative of Norway. According 
to a constitutional provision, public power is distributed between three 
institutions: the parliament, holding the legislative power; the government, 
holding executive power; and independent courts holding judicial power. In 
2014 the parliament passed some significant amendments by including 
provisions on human rights. In contrast to Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 
Norway is not an EU member. 
 
In a comparative Nordic view, Norway’s individual constitutional 
characteristic can be seen linked to the fact that it actively exercises an ex post 
system of judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. This fact is 
closely connected to the central role of the Supreme Court (Høyesterett) and 
also appears to reflect the symbolically central role of the constitution and the 
 
29 Lucky Dev v. Sweden, no. 7356/10, ECHR 2014.  
30 Rousk v. Sweden, no. 27183/04, ECHR 2013. 
31 Lindstrand Partners Advokatbyrå AB v Sweden, no. 18700/09, ECHR 2016. 
32 According to the leading classic book about Norway’s constitutional law, the role of 
customary law is characterised as follows: “Not in any other area of law has customary law 
greater significance than in the area of constitutional law”, Andenæs and Fliflet (2006), p. 
40. 
Supreme Court as its final guardian. With this in mind, to become a justice of 
the Supreme Court seems to be a more significant factor in Norway than in 
the other three systems. 
 
Of all the Nordic countries Norway maintains the strongest tradition of 
judicial review of statutory laws. In effect, although decentralised, this 
control function or power is exercised by the Supreme Court, which reviews 
whether a statute is in conflict with the Constitution. As in the US, in Norway, 
too, this competence was originally not expressly vested in a written 
constitutional document before 2015. But this is certainly not a novelty in 
Norwegian constitutional law. Judicial review of constitutionality emerged as 
long ago as the 19th century.33 However, today’s living tradition can be traced 
to 1976 and the famous Kløfta judgment.34 In this case, which concerned 
compensation for expropriation of property, one can see clearly the effect of 
US constitutional law and ideas which are more alien to other Nordic systems. 
However, even the Norwegian system does not fully follow the American 
model but has instead formulated its own approach, which combines strong 
American judicial review and the Nordic tradition of a softer or 
parliamentary-friendly approach. 
 
In other words, the effects of the Nordic approach can be seen in the fact that 
the Supreme Court does not quash an act or a particular provision of that act, 
i.e. it does not declare an act null and void but, rather, merely sets aside the 
provision in question. Moreover, there is very little similarity with the 
continental European approach, relying on constitutional courts, because the 
Høyesterett eliminates the legal-normative power of a provision only in the 
actual concrete case before the Court. But, of course, because of the de facto 
precedential power of the Høyesterett, its decision actually means that its 
case-bound elimination leads to a situation in which the provision loses its de 
facto authority in other cases too. By the same token, the Høyesterett does not 
seem to seek to replace or challenge the democratically-chosen legislator, 
although it may set legal limits on its legislative competence. 
 
 
33 See Slagstad (1995). 
34 Kløfta. Norsk Retstidende, 1976, p. 1. The precedential outcome of this case is that when 
the courts are asked to decide on the constitutionality of an act, the parliament’s view of 
the matter inevitably plays a crucial role. However, if any doubt arises as to how a statutory 
provision should be interpreted, the courts have a right and a duty to apply the act in the 
manner which best accords with the Constitution. 
In comparison to other Nordic supreme courts, we can argue that Norway’s 
Supreme Court holds the most prestigious position in its own legal context 
and constitutional culture. From a comparative point of view, this means that 
in this particular regard Norway’s Constitution is actually quite close to the 
US Constitution, where the constitutional document and the highest court 
guarding it perform not only a legal function but also a strong symbolic 
function. And, curiously, the relevant old constitutional documents in the US 
and in Norway were both silent (the US Constitution is, of course, still silent) 
on whether the courts can review an act, or a particular provision in an act, in 
regard to its constitutionality. However, in the reform of 2015 a novel 
provision was added. This provides that “[i]n cases brought before the courts, 
the courts have the power and obligation to review whether Acts and other 
decisions by the state authorities are contrary to the Constitution”.35 Basically, 
from a comparative point of view we can see that the heightened role of the 
Høyesterett is also connected to the Norwegian mentality of constitutional 
conservatism.36 In practice, this means that the constitutional act also 
performs an important symbolic function, so that, as a result, the Høyesterett 
gains a special position as the guardian of the nationally-enshrined symbol of 
the statehood – and ultimately the sovereignty – of Norway. 
 
During the last five years, Norway has in seven instances been found by the 
ECtHR to have committed violations of the ECHR. Two cases related to 
expulsion of criminals in violation of Article 8 regarding private and family 
life,37 three cases involved violations of Article 6 regarding fair trial38 and the 
last case involved violation of the right to property protected by Article 1 of 
Protocol no. 1.39 Of the cases in which a violation of Article 6 was found, two 
 
35 This looks like a significant amendment but, in fact, it merely confirmed an established 
customary constitutional rule allowing – and expecting – judicial review. Preparatory 
materials underline the importance of constitutionality by stressing the priority of human 
rights (Rapport fra Menneskerettighetsutvalget om menneskerettigheter i Grunnloven, 
avgitt 19. desember 2011, 79-81). Preparatory materials also explain that constitutional 
judicial review has been part of the Norwegian Constitution for 150 years (Innst. 263 S, 
Innstilling til Stortinget fra kontroll- og konstitusjonskomiteen 2014-2015, 6). 
36 For a more detailed analysis see, e.g., Smith (2011). 
37 Butt v. Norway, no. 47017/09, ECHR 2012; Kaplan and others v. Norway, no. 32504/11, 
ECHR 2014.  
38 Kristiansen and Tyvik As v. Norway, no. 25498/08, ECHR 2013; Hansen v. Norway, no. 
15319/09, ECHR 2014; Kristiansen v. Norway, no. 1176/10, ECHR 2015.  
39 Lindheim and others v. Norway, nos. 12331/08 and 2139/10, ECHR 2012.  
cases concerned civil proceedings,40 while one case was on criminal 
proceedings.41  
 
 
3.4 Denmark’s Constitution 
By and large, Denmark’s constitutional law is based on the Constitutional Act 
of the Kingdom of Denmark in 1849. Although still the basis of the system, 
this old act has been amended many times, most recently in 1953. Like other 
Nordic constitutional acts it enjoys heightened legal status, i.e. it stands at the 
top of the hierarchy of laws. Now, the Act provides for the supreme 
institutions of the state. These are the Folketing (i.e. Danish parliament) 
holding legislative power; the government, holding executive power; and the 
independent courts, holding judicial power. Besides, like so many other 
modern constitutional documents, the Act contains provisions on a number 
of fundamental freedoms and human rights. Like Sweden and Norway, 
Denmark is also a constitutional monarchy that relies on the parliamentary 
system, which in turn means that the power of the monarch is limited by the 
Constitutional Act and customary rules. Generally speaking, the Danish 
system “reflects a legal system and a separation of powers model with a 
strong Parliament” and it has “very few constitutional constraints on the 
content of legislation”.42 In fact, parliamentary precedence has been a feature 
of the Danish legal mentality and legal practice for quite some time.43 It is 
also noteworthy that Denmark has been a member of the EU since 1973 (EEC 
at that time) which means that it took part in European integration 22 years 
before the other two Nordic countries joined the Union. 
 
In a comparative Nordic view, Denmark’s distinctive constitutional 
characteristic has been its almost paradoxical will – despite taking part in 
European integration – to guard its national sovereignty, and later its 
constitutional identity, in relation to the EU. In comparison to Sweden and 
Finland, this feature (i.e. constitutionally motivated reluctance) seems to 
some extent to distinguish the Danish constitutional mindset from the other 
two Nordic EU member states. On the other hand, this fact means that 
Denmark and Norway are close to each other in this particular respect. 
 
 
40 Kristiansen and Tyvik As, 2013; Hansen, 2014. 
41 Kristiansen, 2015. 
42 Krunke (2014), p. 29. 
43 See Schaumburg-Müller (2009). 
The Danish constitutional conception of sovereignty seems to be more 
distinct and outspoken than is the case with the two other Nordic EU member 
states. This is by no means to say that sovereignty and, especially, transfer of 
national competence outside the country would be a walk in the park in 
Sweden and Finland. However, one can grasp the profound extent of the 
Danish conception when this specific feature is highlighted in the context of 
the EU. Now, from a narrow constitutional point of view the Danish approach 
seems in certain respects similar to that in Finland. So, Denmark can basically 
transfer sovereignty to international organisations in two distinct ways. First, 
powers vested in the authorities of the realm may be delegated “to such extent 
as shall be provided by statute” (Article 20). This is a challenging path 
because it requires a five-sixths majority of all members of the parliament. In 
practice it means that at least 150 of the 179 members of the parliament need 
be present and vote in favour of delegation. But, if delegation of powers is 
not provided by statute, or if they are not vested in the authorities of the state, 
sovereignty can only be transferred by amending the Constitution itself. Yet, 
the Constitution Act still has Article 19, allowing the Government to sign 
international treaties that do not transfer sovereignty. This kind of signature 
requires the consent of the parliament by an ordinary majority.  
 
Notwithstanding – and here is the main point – Danish reluctance to transfer 
national competences outside the country does not stem from written 
constitutional provisions but, rather, from the Danish constitutional 
mentality. It is important to realise that this reluctant form of 
constitutionalism seems to be rooted in the constitutional culture of the 
country but is not an outcome of specific constitutional provisions. In 
practice, the Danish courts are sometimes reluctant to refer questions of EU 
law to the ECJ but probably not more than the national courts of other EU 
countries. However, a comparatist may see a slight difference between the 
Danish approach to the ECHR and to the case law of the ECJ, even if the 
difference should not be exaggerated. The Danish courts may, generally 
speaking, have been more open to implementing ECtHR decisions, whereas 
the attitude towards the ECJ can be seen as somewhat more cautious. This 
difference may be connected to the fact that the EU goes further – regarding 
sovereignty – than the ECHR, which is basically an international treaty.  
Moreover, this can be seen as a consequence of the lack of a modern catalogue 
of human rights in the Danish Constitution.44  
 
 
44 Cf. Elo Rytter et al. (2011). 
Clearly, the Nordic constitutional systems place a high value on the primacy 
of parliament. However, Denmark’s uneasy relation with the EU seems to 
indicate an ingrained constitutional vision of a strong national parliament, at 
least in relation to external “competing powers”. This is also reflected in the 
fact that in “the Danish constitutional context with strong Parliaments, courts 
do not play…an active role”.45 It has been pointed out, by a Danish scholar, 
that the underlying idea is that “the Folketing represents the people, and the 
people are sovereign”.46 Although this may be true, we need to be cautious 
about jumping to conclusions; in comparison to Finland and Sweden, the 
difference is certainly not dramatic, but at the same time it seems to 
characterise the Danish constitutional mentality, in particular because it sets 
Denmark in a different position in the European context from the other Nordic 
member states. 
 
During the latest five-year period, only one case brought against Denmark 
before the ECtHR has resulted in a finding of violation. This was found in the 
case of Biao v. Denmark, in which the court found that an exception to Danish 
rules on family reunification – the so-called 28-year rule – violated Article 14 
of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8.47  
 
 
3.5 Iceland’s Constitution 
Iceland was part of Norway until 1814 and after that part of the Kingdom of 
Denmark. The present Constitution (Stjórnarskrá lýðveldisins Ísland) was 
adopted in 1944, when Iceland decided not to continue the union with 
Denmark established in 1918. The Constitution is based on Iceland’s first 
Constitution, given to Iceland in 1874 by the Danish king. This constitution 
again was based on the Danish Constitution of 1849. 
 
The 1944 Constitution was amended several times but still it was felt by many 
that Iceland should have a modern constitution of its own. In an attempt to 
establish a new constitution, a very interesting experiment was undertaken: a 
major part of the Icelandic population would be involved in the constitutional 
work.  In 2009, a coalition government opened a debate on a new constitution. 
A privately organized national assembly of 1,500 members, partly chosen at 
random and partly representing different institutions and groups, started out 
 
45 Krunke (2014), p. 35. 
46 Wind (2009), p. 288. 
47 Biao v. Denmark, no. 38590/10, ECHR 2016.  
with a discussion of the basic principles of a new constitution. A year later, 
the Government followed up by passing an act on a constituent assembly of 
25 delegates elected directly to discuss, among other things, the organization 
of the government and the legislator, the role of the president, judicial control, 
the democratic process and elections, and the use of natural resources.48 
 
However, the election of this body was ruled void by the Supreme Court and 
instead a Constitutional Council (Stjórnlagaráð) was appointed by the 
Icelandic parliament (Althing) in 2011. A draft Constitution was finished on 
29 July 2011 and presented to the parliament. A non-binding constitutional 
referendum was held in October 2012 with a positive result from around 2/3 
of the voters. This reform, however, has so far come to a halt, as the later 
government of the country has not moved the proposal further forward.49 
 
In judicial review Iceland seems to have its own specific approach. Courts 
have been applying judicial review since 1944; however, the volume of cases 
has increased since 1995, when a human rights catalogue was included in the 
constitution. Basically, the Icelandic courts may disregard an Act but not 
formally invalidate it. Essentially, there seems to be relatively little hesitation 
by the courts, politicians, and constitutional theorists to accept the basic idea 
of constitutional judicial review. This can be seen, for instance, in the fact 
that acts are more frequently held to be unconstitutional than in the other 
Nordic countries. Moreover, unlike in the other Nordic countries, there is 
relatively little doctrinal or theoretical discussion that would be genuinely 
critical concerning the role of the courts and there is hardly any political 
opposition to judicial review.50 Be that as it may, generally speaking the 
Icelandic constitutional mentality fits reasonably well within the general 
Nordic framework i.e. there is a lack of judicial activism even though judicial 
review forms part and parcel of the Icelandic constitution. 
 
Iceland has been found at fault in five cases of violations of the ECHR during 
the last five years.51 All five cases concern Article 10 of the convention on 
freedom of expression and were brought against the state by journalists who 
 
48 See Árnason (2011). 
49 Comparison between Icelandic and Irish experiences, see Suteu (2015). 
50 See Helgadóttir (2011). 
51 Björk Eiðsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 46443/09, ECHR 2012; Erla Hlynsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 
43380/10, ECHR 2012; Erla Hlynsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 54125/10, ECHR 2014; Erla 
Hlynsdóttir v. Iceland, no. 54145/10, ECHR 2015; Ólafsson v. Iceland, no. 58493/13, 
ECHR 2017.  
had been convicted by the national courts in defamation proceedings brought 
against them because of their journalistic work. Three of the cases were 
brought before the ECtHR by the same journalist.  
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This brief comparative discussion started from the assumption that, despite 
striking similarities between the Nordic constitutions, there are also 
peculiarities in terms of living constitutions. However, the question is: are 
these peculiarities so different after all? No doubt a deeper comparative 
analysis would reveal commonalities. Finland’s peculiar doctrine on 
controlling constitutionality can be derived from the fact that constitutional 
practice involves a special role for the national parliament. At the same time, 
Finland has caved in concerning the European dimension in terms of the EU 
as well as with the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR.52 Sweden has also 
had its doubts both with the EU and with the ECHR. Even while Sweden 
today is relatively open to the European dimension, it still guards its Nordic-
style understanding of the sources of law and assigns a particularly distinct 
role for legislative preparatory works. Moreover, it seems quite evident that 
this can be explained by Sweden’s constitutional self-understanding, holding 
the Riksdag in a key position and shadowing the constitutional role of rights. 
 
Comparatively speaking, Nordic constitutions are curious; they encompass 
both the idea of popular sovereignty (as a legitimate form of political 
democracy) and the idea of separation of powers. This probably partially 
explains the seemingly low political profile of their supreme courts – they do 
not willingly challenge the legitimacy of parliamentary acts, although they 
are very much legally independent of direct (political) influence by 
legislators. On the whole, the highest Nordic courts seem to feel a great deal 
of loyalty toward their respective parliaments but they do so without direct 
parliamentary guidance (except statutory law, of course), so this is an 
outcome of a Nordic constitutional mentality growing from a certain notion 
of democracy and appreciation of the rule of law. As a result, Nordic 
constitutions are more governance-oriented than rule-oriented; more weight 
 
52 As pointed out by Markku Suksi, Nordic constitutional identity is under pressure both 
from the European Court of Justice and the ECtHR. See Suksi (2014), pp. 83-84. 
seems to be given to institutions than to rights. However, the growing 
significance of fundamental rights is slowly changing the overall picture. 
 
More generally, the Nordic experience – or “Nordicness” – seems to imply 
that constitutional law is both “law” and “politics”, i.e. written constitutional 
documents are insulated against “politics” because constitutions are 
themselves so deeply and profoundly of a political nature.53 Moreover, the 
Nordic experience seems to be pragmatic in its tendency to admit that 
constitutions are about law and politics; written rules are interpreted, applied 
and de facto amended by constitutional practices and interpretations. Yet it is 
beyond doubt that the Nordic countries take their constitutions seriously even 
while their constitutional styles are not identical. Even so, today many 
scholars and lawyers are seeking a stronger rights-based culture and a 
stronger position for judicial review in the Nordic countries. However, only 
time will tell how these pressures will transform the parliament-oriented 
Nordic constitutions. In a broad sense, it is clear that Nordic constitutions and 
“Nordicness” in constitutional laws are not isolated because they are affected 
by global and European legal developments – rights are also gaining more 
weight within the Nordic constitutional sphere. The rise of fundamental rights 
and especially the ECHR have grown in constitutional gravity. 
 
Constitutional protection of fundamental rights varies significantly between 
the Nordic countries. Yet, from a comparative point of view it is easy to see 
that all Nordic systems take fundamental rights seriously. When the Court 
decides against a Nordic country, these countries take measures to deal with 
the problem through legislation or, at least, through interpretation by the 
national judicial organs. The judicial dialogue they have had with the ECtHR 
reflects, however, the domestic special features of each system as the cases 
decided by the ECtHR clearly indicate. 
 
To conclude, the recent Nordic expansion of judicial review may bring about 
a novel challenge to the traditional Nordic notion of democracy. It would 
seem that these systems are slowly gliding towards rule by judges instead of 
rule by parliamentarians. Moreover, if the ECtHR type of judicial activism 
extends to the traditional Nordic understanding of democracy (popular 
 
53 However, it would be a mistake to assume that this connection would be openly admitted: 
indeed, quite the contrary. As Bull (2014, p. 17) says about Sweden, there is “difficulty to 
acknowledge the close connections between law and politics…many participants and 
observers of the system still cling to the idea that law and politics is and should be sharply 
divided”. Yet, in constitutional comparison this connection looks evident. 
sovereignty in an important position) it may become difficult to avoid 
transformation of constitutional cultures favouring parliaments.54 But, then 
again, resilience has always been an underlying feature of Nordic 
constitutions. It is safe to assume that parliamentary focus will not concede 
with haste. 
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